We propose and test a positive model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to occur in … jurisdictions with referendum decisions on policy centralization. Citizens choose centralization of public spending and revenue in … representative democracy, centralization is inefficiently high because representatives can extract political rents by policy …

We propose and test a positive model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to occur in … jurisdictions with referendum decisions on policy centralization. Citizens choose centralization of public spending and revenue in … representative democracy, centralization is inefficiently high because representatives can extract political rents by policy …

We propose and test a positive model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to occur in … jurisdictions with referendum decisions on policy cen-tralization. Citizens choose centralization of public spending and revenue in … representative democracy, centralization is ineffi-ciently high because representatives can extract political rents by policy …

federalism in which centralization is less likely to occur where budget referendums are possible. The reason for this result is … that budget referendums reduce the extent to which pro-centralization regions can commit to a low level of spending … delegating the centralization choice to elected poli-cymakers. In addition, it reduces the ability of higher level policy …

federalism in which centralization is less likely to occur where budget referendums are possible. The reason for this result is … that budget referendums reduce the extent to which pro-centralization regions can commit to a low level of spending … delegating the centralization choice to elected policymakers. In addition, it reduces the ability of higher level policy …

We propose and test a positive model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to occur in … jurisdictions with referendum decisions on policy centralization. Citizens choose centralization of public spending and revenue in … representative democracy, centralization is inefficiently high because representatives can extract political rents by policy …

centralization is not politically feasible, allowing an enhanced cooperation agreement among a subset of countries permits the latter … country, sub-union formation may be optimal. The relative advantage of a sub-union towards centralization increases when … might lead to increased centralization …

the contrasting forces of centralization and decentralization. The paper offers the insight to the policymakersthat while …

centralization is not politically feasible, allowing an enhanced cooperation agreement among a subset of countries permits the latter … country, sub-union formation may be optimal. The relative advantage of a sub-union towards centralization increases when … they might lead to increased centralization. …