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Null or nullifying players : the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions

Brink, René van den - In: Journal of economic theory 136 (2007) 1, pp. 767-775

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The balanced solution for cooperative transferable utility games

Brink, René van den (contributor); … - 2007

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Efficiency and collusion neutrality of solutions for cooperative TU-games

Brink, René van den - 2009

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The Banzhaf value when some players are incompatible

Alonso-Meijide, José M.; Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel; … - In: Homo oeconomicus 26 (2009) 3/4, pp. 403-415

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Consistency and the sequential equal contributions rule for airport problems

Chun, Youngsub; Kayı, Çağatay; Yeh, Chun-hsien - 2008

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Cooperation under interval uncertainty

Alparslan-Gök, S. Zeynep; Miquel, Silvia; Tijs, Stef - In: Mathematical methods of operations research 69 (2009) 1, pp. 99-109

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003858100

An axiomatic characterization of a value for games in partition function form

Hu, Cheng-Cheng; Yang, Yi-You - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 1 (2010) 4, pp. 475-487

theory of games II. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 307317, 1953) to characterize our value. In addition, we … average approach provided by Macho-Stadler et al. (J Econ Theory 135:339-356, 2007). -- externalities ; marginal contributions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009355896

An average lexicographic value for cooperative games

Tijs, Stef; Borm, Peter; Lohmann, Edwin; Quant, Marieke - In: European journal of operational research : EJOR 213 (2011) 1, pp. 210-220

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A matrix approach to TU games with coalition and communication structures

Hamiache, Gérard - In: Social choice and welfare 38 (2012) 1, pp. 85-100

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On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives : the case of two-person NTU games

Peleg, Bezalel; Sudhölter, Peter; Zarzuelo, José M. - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 143-156

On several classes of n-person NTU games that have at least one Shapley NTU value, Aumann characterized this solution by six axioms: Non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Each of the first five axioms is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506430