We study how a profit-maximizing firm prioritizes its supply in a “hybrid marketplace” composed of both private and flexible supply agents. The firm can choose how many private agents to operate and pays them regardless of their work. Flexible agents, on the other hand, make their own...

Ride-sharing platforms face a “productivity paradox”, where any efficiency gained through improved dispatch or pricing strategies will not benefit drivers or riders. We show that this is a limit of the traditional ride-hailing model, and a consequence of the Hall-Horton driver equilibrium...

This paper studies how the potential introduction of autonomous vehicles (AVs) in a fleet of human drivers (HVs) may impact the quality of service and the equality of access to transportation on ride-hailing platforms. We formulate a game-theoretical queueing model in which a platform aims to...

Problem definition. We study a point-to-point transportation problem, where the transportation planner can use both shuttles and mobility-on-demand vehicles (MoDs) to serve the incoming random demand of passengers.A natural example is the problem of employee commute, a setting where employers...

On-demand ridesharing aims to fulfill riders' transportation needs whenever and wherever they want. Although this service level is appealing for riders, overall system efficiency can improve substantially if riders are willing to be flexible. Riders' flexibility in time has previously been...

We consider a platform’s problem of how to staff its operations given the possibilities of hiring employees and setting up a contractor marketplace. We aim to understand the operational difference between using contractors and using employees, as well as the potential for using a hybrid...