We use variation in exposure to victimization of 1,537 households of eastern Congo for each year of 1990-2013 to examine the formation of preferences to participate in armed groups. In this context, most armed groups are Congolese militia, whose objective is fighting foreign armed groups. We...

This paper leverages a novel panel dataset covering the histories of 306 chiefs and 256 episodes of village governance and taxation by armed groups in 106 villages in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in order to analyse the relationship between the governance of armed groups and the...

Armed groups routinely delegate domains of rule to village customary chiefs--indirect rule. The larger a chief's power over the villagers relative to the group's, the more there is indirect rule. Over time, enabled by the chief's efforts to legitimize the group, the group expands the taxes they...

We show that armed actors refrain from using their power to arbitrarily steal from an economy if, and only if, the armed actors' property rights over stealing from that economy are secure. By 2009, armed actors taxed, administered, and protected various villages in Democratic Republic of the...