We run laboratory experiments where subjects are matched to colleges, and colleges are not strategic agents. We test … the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching … robustness of stability between the rounds of experiments. Our findings provide substantial support for the rising practice of …

decision makers in the family and the society. We test these alternative hypotheses running Dictators experiments in Italy, a …

between a classification of subjects into four different types of interdependent preferences (selfish, social welfare …

paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …

Many institutions use matching algorithms to allocate resources to individuals. Examples include the assignment of … welfare in relation to a popular existing mechanism …