We extend Kohlberg and Mertens' (1986) structure theorem concerning the Nash equilibrium correspondence to show that its graph is not only homeomorphic to the underlying space of games but that it is also unknotted. This is then shown to have some basic consequences for dynamics whose rest...

The Nash equilibrium solution concept for games is based on the assumption of expected utility maximization. Reference dependant utility functions are a better predictor of behaviour than expected uitlity. In particular, loss aversion is an important element of such utility functions. We extend...

The authors study market games with multiple posts per commodity. They provide some facts that characterize prices of commodities across posts and show some interesting results.

The location of facilities in order to provide service for customers is a well-studied problem in the operations research literature. In this paper, we establish strong connextions between fair cost allocations and linear programming relaxations for several variants of the facility location...

Purely non-cooperative principles, as itereted dominance and backward induction, explain divided government.

In this work, a new axiomatization of the Shapley value is presented. An associated game is constructed which can also be interpreted as a perturbation of the original game. We define a sequence of games, when the term of order n, in this sequence, is the associated game of the term of order (n-1).