We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets, i.e. markets in which all agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. In matching markets, taxes can generate inefficiency on the allocative margin by changing who is matched to whom, even if the number of...

In this paper, we argue that models coming from a variety of fields share a common structure that we call matching function equilibria. This structure revolves around an aggregate matching function and a system of nonlinear equations. This encompasses search and matching models, matching models...

In this paper, we address the problem of estimating transport surplus (a.k.a. matching affinity) in high dimensional optimal transport problems. Classical optimal transport theory specifies the matching affinity and determines the optimal joint distribution. In contrast, we study the inverse...

Using results from convex analysis, we investigate a novel approach to identification and estimation of discrete choice models which we call the “Mass Transport Approach” (MTA). We show that the conditional choice probabilities and the choice specific payoffs in these models are related in...

This is a preliminary draft of the manuscript of my textbook "Optimal Transport Methods in Economics" (to appear), based on lectures given at MIT in Spring 2015. The present preprint version is circulated to invite comments by readers

This paper provides closed-form formulas for a multidimensional two-sided matching problem with transferable utility and heterogeneity in tastes. When the matching surplus is quadratic, the marginal distributions of the characteristics are normal, and when the heterogeneity in tastes is of the...

The problem of demand inversion -- a crucial step in the estimation of randomutility discrete-choice models -- is equivalent to the determination of stable outcomes intwo-sided matching models. This equivalence applies to random utility models that are notnecessarily additive, smooth, nor even...

We propose an alternative notion of non-transferable utility (NTU) stability in matching models that relies on money burning. Our model captures an exchange economy with indivisible goods, fixed prices, and no centralized assignment mechanism. In these models, a non-transferable numeraire (e.g.,...

This paper contributes to the literature on hedonic models in two ways. First, it makes use of Queyranne's reformulation of a hedonic model in the discrete case as a network flow problem in order to provide a proof of existence and integrality of a hedonic equilibrium and efficient computational...