We investigate the impact of endogenous information acquisition on Easley and O'Hara's (2004) result that moving information from being publicly to privately available results in an increase in a firm's cost of capital. As in Christensen, de la Rosa and Feltham (2010), when the cost of...

Abstract This paper studies information-based manipulation in a setting where sophisticated investors have access to an independent source of information. It is shown that investors' access to independent information is crucial to support truthful announcements by the manipulator. However, even...

We investigate the impact of endogenous information acquisition on Easley and O'Hara's (2004) result that moving information from being publicly to privately available results in an increase in a firm's cost of capital. As in Christensen et al. (2010), when the cost of information acquisition is...

This paper considers the problem of information acquisition in an intermediated market, where the specialists have access to superior technology for acquiring information. These informational advantages of specialists relative to households lead to disagreement between the two groups, changing...

We treat information acquisition by potential investors in initial public offerings as endogenous. With endogenous information, the critical question is why underwriters would allow investors to spend resources acquiring superior information intended solely to effect a wealth transfer. We show...

Informational advantages of specialists relative to households lead to disagreement between the two in an intermediated market. The additional information is, however, costly to the specialists, making it rational for specialists to limit the accuracy of the signals they observe. I show that...