Using a large panel of Chinese listed companies over the period 2004-2010, we document that both export propensity and intensity increase with managerial ownership up to a point of around 23%-27%, and decrease thereafter. In addition, we find a negative association between state ownership and...

Corporate capital structure decisions are key determinants of firm performance. The agency theory suggests that debt financing is one of the mechanisms to mitigate agency problems and thus to improve firm performance. This paper provides important evidence on the performance effects of capital...

The study of corporate governance is gaining momentum as corporate governance compliance has been made mandatory. Even though made mandatory, the number of corporate governance issues are on the rise. The high profile scandals in Enron, World Com and also the Satyam scandal, Tata Mistry issues...

Consistent with the view that “busy” analysts face time and effort constraints in monitoring firms, we find that higher busyness lowers firm valuation. The underlying mechanisms include lower operating performance, higher cost of capital, greater earnings management, excessive CEO...

This paper builds on Rosen (1981) and Hvide (2002) to provide a simple framework that elucidates the nature of incentives in the tournaments among top executives in both the external managerial labor market for the top executive positions in other companies and within the executives' own firm...

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in assessing the effectiveness of corporate governance in China. This paper examines the impact of internal governance mechanisms such as ownership structure and board characteristics and debt financing on agency costs making use of a large...

We study the effect of corporate board structure on firm performance under different product market conditions. Using customer-supplier links to identify exogenous downstream demand shocks, we find that board independence has a more significant effect on firm performance when the firm-specific...

When public institutions do not support information disclosure and contract enforcement, controlling owners may compensate by setting up ownership networks that facilitate the exchange of resources and alignment of interests. We examine how firms' controlling owners draw power from ownership...

We model and empirically assess industry tournament incentives for CEOs. The measures we develop for the tournament prize derive from the compensation gap between the CEO at her firm and the highest-paid CEO among similar competing firms. The model predicts that firm performance and risk...

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship of value-based performance measures – economic value added (EVA), market value added (MVA) and cash value added (CVA) – with corporate governance using data on 41 corporations listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange-100 Index....