The paper generalizes Kuhn's Theorem to extensive form games in which players condition their play on the realization of ambiguous randomization devices and use a maxmin decision rule to evaluate the consequences of their decisions. It proves that ambiguous behavioral and ambiguous mixed...

Previous experimental results on one-shot sequential two-player games show that group decisions are closer to the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium than individual decisions. We extend the analysis of inter-group versus inter-individual decision making by running both one-shot and repeated...

We analyze a robust version of the Dynkin game over a set P of mutually singular probabilities. We first prove that conservative player's lower and upper value coincide (Let us denote the value by $V$). Such a result connects the robust Dynkin game with second-order doubly reflected backward...

This paper proposes and studies a mechanism modelling the emergence of cooperation in non-cooperative multi-player extensive form games. We consider such games enriched with additional “stage bidding actions”, where at each decision node of the game tree, before the player controlling that...