In a tournament, agents form coalitions, and the coalition with largest power wins the tournament. We introduce a new solution concept for the tournaments, called no threat equilibrium (NTE). NTE is a partition of the agents, where prudent and farsighted agents have no incentive to deviate....

Previous experimental results on one-shot sequential two-player games show that group decisions are closer to the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium than individual decisions. We extend the analysis of inter-group versus inter-individual decision making by running both one-shot and repeated...

This paper proposes and studies a mechanism modelling the emergence of cooperation in non-cooperative multi-player extensive form games. We consider such games enriched with additional “stage bidding actions”, where at each decision node of the game tree, before the player controlling that...

We analyze whether incentives from relative performance pay are reduced or enhanced if a department is possibly terminated due to a crisis. Our benchmark model shows that incentives decrease in a severe crisis, but are boosted given a minor crisis since efforts are strategic complements in the...