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This paper examines how regulation functions in China’s dynamic authoritarian setting through the study of changes in political and social influences on environmental enforcement in Guangzhou city between 2000 and 2006. The paper finds that a form of 'decentered regulation' has developed in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014167676
This study examines changes in enforcement styles among environmental enforcement officials in the context of China’s rapidly changing institutional environments, using panel data collected in Guangzhou in 2000 and 2006. Altogether, five enforcement style elements were...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008517682
The authors investigated the relationship between enforcement styles and perceptions of enforcement effectiveness in China by surveying three groups of environmental protection bureau officials from the major cities of Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Dalian. In general, it was found that organizational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005595353
What role can public participation play in environmental management? Among major tools for environmental management, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) has been widely practised in many countries. Its effectiveness, however, varies depending on the extent to which transparency and public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005511794
The enforcement behaviour of environmental officials in developing countries has not received adequate attention despite enormous challenges to regulatory enforcement in those areas. Accordingly, this article examines the relationship between perceptions of support from local governments and...
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This paper investigates the making of optimal regulatory standard in a game theoretical model. We demonstrate that the optimal regulatory standard is robust and irrelevant to interest group pressure under different market structures. Stated differently, the source of rulemaking outcome variation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013112852