Conventional wisdom suggests that CEO membership of the compensation committee is an open invitation to rent extraction by self-serving executives. However, using data from New Zealand – where CEO compensation committee membership was rel- atively common until quite recently – we find that...

This study presents an integrated investigation into the factors affecting executive ownership, the market value of the finn, and executive compensation by explicitly incorporating the simultaneity of the process determining these variables into the empirical estimation, Overall, the results of...

The efficacy of boards of directors as a critical governance institution has attracted increasing scrutiny in the wake of the recent financial meltdown. CEO compensation which consequentially determines overall management compensation in a firm, is a key governance decision entrusted with the...

Prior research suggests that the effectiveness of corporate directors depends on their qualifications. We investigate whether directors' qualifications affect the roles they perform on the board (board functions) and their compensation. On average, directors that are more qualified handle more...

We analyze how the reputational concerns of boards influence executive compensation and the use of hidden pay. Independent boards reduce disclosed pay to signal their independence, but are more likely to use inefficient hidden pay than manager-friendly boards. Stronger reputational pressures...

Published by The Conference Board in collaboration with Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., CEO and Executive Compensation Practices: 2015 Edition documents trends and developments on senior management compensation at companies issuing equity securities registered with the US Securities and Exchange...

Executive compensation is said to be for performance and, in liberal market economies, the board of directors along with compensation committees have largely been in charge of safeguarding pay for performance. This executive compensation system is legally protected by the business judgment rule...

We analyze the role of using CEO compensation and capital requirements in bank regulation. With a passive uninformed board that delegates the choice of bank strategy to the CEO, requiring a compensation contract where the CEO receives a fixed fraction of total bank payoff eliminates the risk...