It is well known that a social choice function is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if it is incentive compatible. However, in general it is not possible to rule out other equilibrium outcomes, and additional conditions, e.g., Bayesian monotonicity, are needed to...

This paper argues that an external monitor can be less effective when there is uncertainty regarding the quality of the management and the business environment. In a two-period model, an outside monitor, who initially does not know managerial quality, can have the manager fired. The manager...

In this note we consider several versions of the bootstrap and argue that it is helpful in explaining and thinking about such procedures to use an explicit representation of the random resampling process. To illustrate the point we give such explicit representations and use them to produce some...

It is well-know that estimation by reduced rank regression is given by the solution to a generalized eigenvalue problem. This paper presents a new proof to establish this result and provides additional insight into the structure of the estimation problem. The proof is a direct algebraic proof...

An appropriate (interim) notion of the core for an economy with incomplete information depends on the amount of information that coalitions can share. The coarse and fine core, as originally defined by Wilson (1978), correspond to two polar cases, involving no information sharing and arbitrary...

When alternatives are compared using an estimated criterion function, this may introduce a discrepancy between the true and the estimated criterion. In this paper, we consider a situation where a preordering (ranking) of stochastic sequences is defined from expected loss/gain, using a parametric...

It is known that the incompleteness of asset markets causes inefficiency in almost every equilibrium. Yet unexplored is the ”size” of this inefficiency. The size of a Pareto improvement is the total willingness to pay for it, out of current consumption. Inefficiency is the maximum size of...

We consider robust virtual implementation, where robustness is the requirement that implementation succeed in all type spaces consistent with a given payoff type space as well as with a given space of first-order beliefs about the other agents’ payoff types. This last bit, which constitutes...

This paper applies the Model Confidence Set (MCS) procedure of Hansen, Lunde, and Nason (2003) to a set of volatility models. A MCS is analogous to confidence interval of a parameter in the sense that the former contains the best forecasting model with a certain probability. The key to the MCS...