We investigate the effect of the timing of green technology investment in a polluting duopoly facing environmental regulation. We consider a three-stage game where (i) firms sequentially choose their investment in the first stage, (ii) the regulator sets the optimal emission fee in the second...

We examine how an extreme climate event affects the incentives of regulators to invest in adaptation measures that reduce the impact on firms production costs, and how this investment affects environmental policy and firms incentives to invest in abatement. Different government agencies...

We examine an entry-deterrence model in the commons. We investigate in which contexts the presence of asymmetric information among the fi?rms exploiting the commons becomes welfare improving, relative to complete information, and in which settings an uninformed regulator might have incentives to...

This paper investigates the signaling role of tax policy in promoting or hindering the ability of a monopolist to practice entry deterrence. We study contexts in which tax policy is Flexible and inflexible. We show that not only an informative equilibrium can be supported where information is...

This paper examines countries’ free-riding incentives in international environmental agreements (IEAs) when, first, the treaty is non-enforceable, and second, countries do not have complete information about other countries’ noncompliance cost. We analyze a signaling model whereby the...

This paper examines countries’ free-riding incentives in international environmental agreements (IEAs) when, first, the treaty is non-enforceable, and second, countries do not have complete information about other countries’ noncompliance cost. We analyze a signaling model whereby the...

This paper examines the two externalities that a country's environmental regulation imposes on other country's welfare: an environmental externality, due to transboundary pollution, and a competitive advantage externality, as regulations affect domestic firms' abatement costs, which impact the...

This paper investigates a signaling entry deterrence model under learning-by-doing. We show that a monopolist’s practice of entry deterrence imposes smaller welfare losses (or larger welfare gains) when learning effects are present than when they are absent, making the intervention of...

This paper analyzes the protection of a common pool resource (CPR) through the manage- ment of information. Speci?cally, we examine an entry deterrence model between an incumbent perfectly informed about the initial stock of a CPR and an uninformed potential entrant. In our model, the...

This paper investigates the role of uncertainty as a tool to support cooperation in international environmental agreements. We consider two layers of uncertainty. Under unilateral uncertainty treaties become successful with positive probability in the signaling game, even under parameter...