voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t+1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game … alternative, and the discount factor (committee impatience). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and myopic …

each district. We analyze the Markov perfect equilibrium under different voting q-rules where q is the number of yes votes … experiment with fiveperson committees that compares three alternative voting rules: unanimity (q=5); majority (q=3); and …

ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process …. We conduct an experimental voting game in which decision makers vote about the allocation of money between themselves and … recipients without voting rights. We measure responsibility attributions for voting decisions by eliciting the monetary …

interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who … characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how … correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then …

impact of the voting procedure, no information about the cooperation history is provided. In line with existing empirical …

committees benefits from voting insincerely accrue not only when a decision maker's vote is pivotal. As the number of voters … increases, the cost of voting insincerely declines in an open committee because the probability of being pivotal declines. This … is not the case in a closed committee where costs and benefits of insincere voting only arise when a voter is pivotal. …