We consider a war of attrition where the players can learn about a state that determines their payoffs at stochastic deadline. We study how the incentives to acquire information depend on the (un)verifiability of information and its implications for efficiency. Unverifiability creates...

This paper quantitatively analyzes the importance of taste versus health in food demand, as well as the effect on consumers’ experienced taste of the non-intrinsic value of healthy labels. Our analysis is based on taste experiments and Vickrey second price auctions on potato chips and bread....

Meier (2012) gave a "mathematical logic foundation" of the purely measurable universal type space (Heifetz and Samet, 1998). The mathematical logic foundation, however, discloses an inconsistency in the type space literature: a finitary language is used for the belief hierarchies and an...

We compare forecasts from different adaptive learning algorithms and calibrations applied to US real-time data on inflation and growth. We find that the Least Squares with constant gains adjusted to match (past) survey forecasts provides the best overall performance both in terms of forecasting...

El profesor Forero en su ensayo plantea que en los actuales momentos y dada ladesaparición del enfrentamiento entre socialismo real y lo que él llama Capitalismogenérico", se pueden analizar las distintas dimensiones de un modelo económico quepermite comprender las diversas variantes del...

In this paper we present and estimate a synthesis of previous equilibrium search models: allowing for continuous distributions of workers opportunity costs of employment, as well as firms’ productivities. The model allows for on-the-job search, and we assume that job offer arrival rates for...

In this paper we study how the presence of a small amount of noise in signaling games impacts on the likelihood of separation and, hence, the likelihood of information transmission. We consider a variant of a standard signaling model where a source of exogenous noise affects the signals that...

In this paper we identify a novel reason why signaling may fail to separate types, which is specific to cases where the receiver has to incur a cost to acquire the signal sent by the sender. If the receiver chooses not to incur the acquisition cost, then all sender's types find it optimal to...

We develop a model of persuasion where, consistent with the psychological literature on dual process theory, the persuadee has to sustain a cognitive effort - the elaboration cost - in order to fully and precisely elaborate information. The persuader makes an offer to the persuadee and, aware...