This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clark-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted...

The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction.The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation...

The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same time achieved a more competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and presents a game theoretic explanation of observed...

Clemens Fuest und Niklas Potrafke, beide ifo Institut und LMU München, diskutieren, ob die deutsche Schuldenbremse einer ökonomisch sinnvollen Staatsverschuldung im Weg stehe. Forschungsergebnisse legten nahe: Wenn die Politik Haushaltsdefizite, Verschuldungsquoten sowie Risikoprämien auf...

Deutschland erlebt derzeit einen erheblichen Rückgang seines Produktionspotenzials. Wesentliche Ursache ist die demografische Alterung und insbesondere der Eintritt der geburtenstarken Jahrgänge (Baby-Boomer) in den Ruhestand. Das verfügbare Arbeitsvolumen wird darüber hinaus durch niedrige...

Immer wieder werden die sinkenden Stromgestehungskosten erneuerbarer Energien herangezogen, um zu argumentieren, dass die Stromkosten in Deutschland sinken werden. Die Stromgestehungskosten stellen jedoch keine belastbare Grundlage für die Einschätzung der zukünftigen Stromkosten dar....

We analyze the effect of price caps on equilibrium production and welfare in oligopoly under demand uncertainty. We find that high price caps always increase production and welfare as compared to the situation without price cap. Price caps close to marginal cost may lead to zero production,...

We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking...

We analyze a market game where firms choose capacities under uncertainty about future market conditions and make output choices after uncertainty has unraveled. We show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium under imperfect competition and establish that capacity choices by strategic firms are...

In this paper we propose a three-level computational equilibrium model that allows to analyze the impact of the regulatory environment on transmission line expansion (by the regulator) and investment in generation capacity (by private firms) in liberalized electricity markets. The basic model...