This paper introduces stochastic games with imperfect public signals. It provides a sufficient condition for the folk theorem when the game is irreducible, thus generalizing the results of Dutta (1995) and Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994). To do this, the paper extends the concept of...

This paper shows that larger auctions are more efficient than smaller ones, but that despite this scale effect, two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. We find that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the...

The dual self-model of self-control with one-period lived short-run selves is excessively sensitive to the timing of shocks and to the interpolation of additional “noaction†time periods in between the dates when decisions are made. We show that when short-run selves have a random...

The most widely used economic models of social preferences are specified only for certain outcomes. There are two obvious methods of extending them to lotteries. If we do so by expected utility theory, so that the independence axiom is satisfied, our results imply that the resulting preferences...

In a repeated game with imperfect public information, the set of equilibria depends on the way that the distribution of public signals varies with the players' actions. Recent research has focused on the case of “frequent monitoring,†where the time interval between periods becomes...