Di erent discrete time triangular arrays representing a noisy signal of players' activities can lead to the same limiting di usion process yet lead to di erent limit equilibria. Whether the limit equilibria are equilibria of the limiting continuous time game depends on the limit properties of...

We show that the use of communications to coordinate equilibria generates a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with “almost public†information. The results generalize to the <i>n</i>-person case. However, the two-person case is more difficult because it is not possible to sustain...

This essay discusses the field of behavioral economics, with a focus on the papers in <i>Advances in Behavioral Economics</i>. These papers show that there is a body of “behavioral facts†that is both economically significant and regular enough to be modeled. For the field to advance further,...

This paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with long- and short-run players and little discounting. Because the short-run players are unconcerned about the future, each equilibrium outcome is constrained to lie on their static reaction (best-response) curves. The natural...

Forecasts are said to be calibrated if the frequency predictions are approximately correct. This is a refinement of an idea first introduced by David Blackwell in 1955. We show that “<i>K</i>-initialized myopic strategies†are approximately calibrated when <i>K</i> is large. These strategies first...

This paper studies the effect of randomness in per-period matching on the long-run outcome of non-equilibrium adaptive processes. If there are many matchings between each strategy revision, the randomness due to matching will be small; our question is when a very small noise due to matching has...

Players choose an action before learning an outcome chosen according to an unknown and history-dependent stochastic rule. Procedures that categorize outcomes, and use a randomized variation on fictitious play within each category are studied. These procedures are “conditionally...

We define and analyze a "strategic topology'' on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance between a pair of types as the difference...