We show that the probability that Bayesian posteriors assign to the outcome distributions that do not ``best fit'' the empirical distribution in terms of Kullback-Leibler divergence converges to zero at a uniform and exponential rate, even when the prior does not have full support. This extends...

Noncooperative game theory is a way of modelling and analyzing situations in which each player's optimal decisions depend on his beliefs or expectations about the play of his opponents. Game-theoretic methodology has caused deep and wide-reaching changes in the way that practitioners think about...

We derive a simplified version of the model of Fudenberg and Levine [2006, 2011] and show how this approximate model is useful in explaining choice under risk. We show that in the simple case of three outcomes, the model can generate indifference curves that “fan out” in the Marshack-Machina...

We characterize two sorts of stochastic choice rules in which the agent makes current decisions using a forward-looking value function that takes future randomizations into account. Both sorts of rules generalize logistic choice, and are equivalent to it in static problems. The rules differ in...

We show that Bayesian posteriors concentrate on the outcome distributions that approximately minimize the Kullback–Leibler divergence from the empirical distribution, uniformly over sample paths, even when the prior does not have full support. This generalizes Diaconis and Freedman's (1990)...

The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We show that...