We develop a model of undescribable events. Examples of events that are well understood by economic agents but are prohibitively difficult to describe in advance abound in real-life. This notion has also pervaded a substantial amount of economic literature. We put forth a model of such events...

The paper studies a contracting problem in which a Principal enters in two-sided moral hazards with N independent agents. There are no technological or informational linkages between the N agency problems: The Principal's costs are additive across agents; there is no common uncertainty in the...

A player inuences a collective outcome if his actions can change the probability of that outcome. He is Æ-pivotal if this change exceeds some threshold Æ. We study inuence in general environments with N players and arbitrary sets of signals. It is shown that inuence is maximized when players'...

: The paper provides a model where authority relationships are founded on reputation. The viability of authority is the result of subordinates' free-riding on each other challenges, reducing the frequency of challenges, and making reputations worth defending. The party with authority secures...