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The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - 1995
We consider an auction in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned off to n bidders. The k highest bidders get an object and pay the k+1st bid. Bidders receive a signal that provides information about the value of the object. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibirum of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012235959
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Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - 1996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000958014
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Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: The American economic review 90 (2000) 3, pp. 499-525
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001505350
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The loser's curse and information aggregation in common value auctions
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000929569
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The loser's curse and information aggregation in common value auctions
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 65 (1997) 6, pp. 1247-1281
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001230476
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The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: Econometrica 65 (1997) 6, pp. 1247-1282
The authors consider an auction in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned off to n bidders. The k highest bidders get an object and pay the k + 1st bid. Bidders receive a signal that provides information about the value of the object. The authors characterize the unique...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332936
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The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 65 (1997) 6, pp. 1247-1282
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006790782
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Articles - Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: The American economic review 90 (2000) 3, pp. 499-525
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006837199
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The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 1995
We consider an auction in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned off to n bidders. The k highest bidders get an object and pay the k+1st bid. Bidders receive a signal that provides information about the value of the object. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibirum of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824489
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Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 1996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766886