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We study optimal price discrimination when a monopolist faces a continuum of consumers with reference-dependent preferences. A consumer's valuation for product quality consists of an intrinsic valuation affected by a private state signal (type), and a gain-loss valuation that depends on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011251904
It is shown that player mobility has important consequences for the long-run equilibrium distribution in dynamic evolutionary models of strategy adjustment, when updating is prone to small probability perturbations, i.e. “mistakes” or “mutations.” Ellison (1993) concluded that the effect...
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Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. The signals are independent and identically distributed across time but not necessarily across agents. We show that when each agent's signal space is finite, the agents will commonly learn...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332090
Many refinements of Nash equilibrium yield solution correspondences that do not have closed graph in the space of payoffs or information. This has significance for implementation theory, especially under complete information. If a planner is concerned that all equilibria of his mechanism yield a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332675
We introduce a class of strategies that generalizes examples constructed in two-player games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after every private history, each player's continuation strategy is optimal independently of his belief about his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332922
Wilson (1987) criticizes the existing literature of game theory as relying too much on common-knowledge assumptions. In reaction to Wilson's critique, the recent literature of mechanism design has started to employ stronger solution concepts such as dominant strategy incentive compatibility, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342273
We conducted a field experiment to test the benefit from late bidding (sniping) in online auction markets. We compared sniping to early bidding (squatting) in auctions for newly-released DVDs on eBay. Sniping led to a statistically significant increase in our average surplus. However, this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014622