This paper presents a model of real effort provision in conjunction with social preference theory to predict how individuals exert effort to replace an exogenously determined "state of the world" with a preferred social outcome. Binary dictator games and real effort tasks are used to examine...

This paper theoretically and experimentally studies the role of two behavioral biases in all-pay auctions for charity. The theory is developed to predict the effect of loss aversion in the first-price all-pay auction and sunk cost sensitivity in the war of attrition. Using controlled laboratory...

Firms often worry about how buyers will react when there is an inventory shortage, but the anticipation of facing a shortage may also impact buyer behavior. In this paper we use a combination of theoretical modeling, computational methods, and laboratory experiments to understand buyers' search...

This paper uses daily panel data to study the effects that entrepreneurs' social networks have on the success of their projects seeking capital from a potentially large group of individual investors (i.e. crowdfunding). Much of the literature to date demonstrates both theoretically and...

This paper experimentally tests the effectiveness of three crowdsourced signaling mechanisms on their ability to resolve an asymmetric information problem over product quality for a set of consumers. Motivated by naturally occurring environments, the first mechanism allowed experimental subjects...

Research and Development (R&D) investments can lead to robust stock returns in many instances. Investments in R&D create significant information asymmetry between the firm and the general public, which can lead to volatile trading activity as a result of the uncertainty stemming from the R&D...

HighlightsSemi-nonparametric Estimation of Secret Reserve Prices in AuctionsThis letter proposes an estimation method for the distribution of unobservable secret seller reserve prices in auctions. Within the symmetric independent private values model, I construct a two stage estimate via the...

Auctions that generate public good benefits for bidders through revenue, such as those run by a charity, do not adhere to the revenue equivalence theorem. Instead, theory predicts that all-pay auctions will generate greater expected revenues than winner-pay mechanisms. However, this paper...

This paper models a war of attrition where participants first choose contest investment levels that act as a constraint for how long they can compete. To include a measure of the resource's transferability to other uses (e.g. other contests), expenditures are a convex combination of investment...