It is shown that, under a natural assumption, minimum discrepancy estimators in the analysis of moment structures are asymptotically unbiased.

This paper studies the optimal policies of borrowers (firms or individuals) who may default subject to default costs, and analyzes the asset pricing implications. Borrowers defaulting under adverse economic conditions may, despite incurring default costs, emerge as wealthier than non-borrowers...

Money managers are rewarded for increasing the value of assets under management. This gives a manager an implicit incentive to exploit the well-documented positive fund-flows to relative-performance relationship by manipulating her risk exposure. The misaligned incentives create potentially...

Money managers are rewarded for increasing the value of assets under management, and predominantly so in the mutual fund industry. This gives the manager an implicit incentive to exploit the well-documented positive fund-flows to relative-performance relationship by manipulating her risk...

This article studies an economy with borrowers (firms or individuals) under costly default. Borrowers defaulting under adverse economic conditions may, despite incurring default costs, emerge as wealthier than nonborrowers. Asset substitution is generally not pronounced, although a larger risk...

This paper investigates a fund manager's risk-taking incentives induced by an increasing and convex fund-flows to relative-performance relationship. In a dynamic portfolio choice framework, we show that the ensuing convexities in the manager's objective give rise to a finite risk-shifting range...

Portfolio theory must address the fact that, in reality, portfolio managers are evaluated relative to a benchmark, and therefore adopt risk management practices to account for the benchmark performance. We capture this risk management consideration by allowing a prespecified shortfall from a...

This paper investigates a fund manager's risk-taking incentives induced by an increasing and convex fund-flows to relative-performance relationship. In a dynamic portfolio choice framework, we show that the ensuing convexities in the manager's objective give rise to a finite risk-shifting range...