We investigate whether social capital influences the use and effectiveness of tournament structure of compensation. We find that pay differentials between the CEO and other executives, or tournament, are lower in U.S. counties with higher social capital. In addition, lower pay differentials are...

We analyze the relation of private firms' CEO compensation with the probability of sale of a firm and its valuation at the time of the sale. Specifically, we study whether equity-based remuneration is consistent with compensating the CEO for effort related to selling the private firm, or with...

Using a cross-country sample, we examine the CEO tournament structure (measured alternatively as the ratio and the difference of pay between the CEO and other top executives within a firm). We find the tournament structure to vary systematically with firm and country cultural characteristics. In...

Using a cross-country sample, we examine the CEO tournament structure (measured alternatively as the ratio and the difference of pay between the CEO and other top executives within a firm). We find the tournament structure to vary systematically with firm and country cultural characteristics. In...

We investigate the effect that U.S. acquisitions of targets in emerging and developed countries have on the targets' rivals by measuring their stock price reaction to the acquisition announcement. On average, emerging market rivals react positively to these acquisitions while the reaction in...

Given the increasing use of equity-incentive compensation in Europe, we examine the effects of executive compensation and investor protection on payout policy. We find a negative (positive) relationship between equity-incentive compensation and dividends (repurchases). In countries with weak...