We study equilibria in second price auctions when bidders are independently and privately informed about both their values and participation costs and their joint distributions across bidders are not necessarily identical. We show that there always exists an equilibrium in this general setting...

This paper studies equilibria of second price auctions when values and participation costs are both privation information and are drawn from general distribution functions. We consider the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. It is shown that there always exists an equilibrium for this...

This paper characterizes the equilibria of first price auctions with participation costs in the independent private values environment. Bidders use cutoff strategies to decide whether they will participate in the auction. It is shown that, when bidders are homogeneous, there always exists a...

We study equilibria in second price auctions when bidders are independently and privately informed about both their values and participation costs and their joint distributions across bidders are not necessarily identical. We show that there always exists an equilibrium in this general setting...

We study the endogenous participation problem when bidders are characterized by a twodimensional private information on valuations and participation costs in first-price auctions. Bidders participate whenever their private costs are less than or equal to the expected revenue from participating....