We consider a single object allocation problem with multidimensional signals and interdependent valuations. When agents signals are statistically independent, Jehiel and Moldovanu show that efficient and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms generally do not exist. In this paper, we extend...

This paper provides a micro-foundation for approximate incentive compatibility using ambiguity aversion. In particular, we propose a novel notion of approximate interim incentive compatibility, approximate local incentive compatibility, and establish an equivalence between approximate local...

This paper provides a micro-foundation for approximate incentive compatibility using ambiguity aversion. In particular, we propose a novel notion of approximate interim incentive compatibility, approximate local incentive compatibility, and establish an equivalence between approximate local...

This paper studies when the presence of a small degree of ambiguity guarantees efficient implementation in general mechanism design settings. First, we show that if approximately efficient allocations are implementable in a Bayesian environment, then exactly efficient allocations are...

We consider a dynamic economy in which agents are initially unaware of some risks. As awareness of these risks emerges, markets re-open so agents can re-optimize and purchase insurance. An inefficiency may nonetheless arise as the cost of insurance is not spread over time. This "savings mistake"...

The paper provides a representation theorem for the class of all stationary preferences in a stochastic environment. A notion of ambiguity aversion applicable to such preferences is also proposed. The analysis helps discriminate between dynamic models of ambiguity aversion and expected utility...

The rate of time preference is traditionally defined as the marginal rate of substitution between current and future consumption. This definition is not applicable when outcomes are indivisible. Such is the case in all discrete-choice dynamic problems which arise, for example, in modeling...