This research examines the relation between political corruption and mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that local corruption increases firm acquisitiveness but decreases firm targetiveness. The levels of corruption in acquirer areas relate positively to the bid premiums and negatively to...

I empirically investigate the relation between CEO inside debt holdings and mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and find evidence consistent with the agency theory's prediction of a negative relation between CEO inside debt holdings and corporate risk taking. Further analysis shows that CEO inside...

We examine the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings and the firm's choice between debt and equity financing when it accesses external capital markets. We find positive relations between CEO inside debt holdings and both the firm's likelihood to issue debt and the...

We examine the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) sensation seeking, which captures the desire for varied, novel, and complex personal sensations and experiences, and corporate debt contracting. Using pilot certificates as a proxy for the personality trait of sensation seeking, we...

This paper examines the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings and corporate debt maturity. We provide robust evidence that inside debt has a positive effect on short-maturity debt and that this effect is concentrated in financially unconstrained firms that face...

Mandatory pension contributions (MCs) are negative shocks to a firm's liquidity that can unfavorably impact its cost of capital, financing, and investment plans. We study whether firms faced with MCs use both non-cash (NEM) and cash generating earnings management (CEM) to partly offset their...

We exploit the staggered adoption of the universal demand (UD) laws across U.S. states, which impedes shareholder rights to initiate derivative lawsuits, as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the relation between shareholder litigation rights and firm capital structures. We find that weaker...

We use the staggered adoption of Wrongful Discharge Laws (WDLs) by U.S. state courts as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the causal impact of firing costs and employment protection on corporate payouts. We find that the greater employment protection imposed by WDLs leads to higher share...

This research examines the relation between tournament-based incentives, which are proxied by the difference between a firm's CEO pay and the median pay of the senior managers, and mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that tournament-based incentives are positively related to firm...

We exploit the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws, which hinders shareholders' rights to initiate derivative lawsuits, by 23 states in the United States from 1989-2005 as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the effects of shareholder litigation as a corporate governance mechanism...