Exchanges implement intentional trade delays to limit the harmful impact of low-latency trading. Do such "speed bumps" curb investment in fast trading technology? Data is scarce since trading technologies are proprietary. We build an experimental trading platform where participants face speed...

Faster trading improves liquidity in periodic call auction markets, in contrast to continuous-timemarkets. We build a model where high-frequency traders (HFTs) engage in duels to trade onstale quotes. More frequent periodic auctions increase the likelihood that a single HFT arrives inany given...

We run a randomized online experiment to study the impact of trading platform gamification on retail traders' risk taking. We recruit 605 participants from four countries, two-thirds of them reporting self-directed trading experience, to trade a virtual asset on an experimental platform. The...

We model how ETFs compete and set fees. We show that ETF secondary market liquidity plays a key role in determining fees and leads to liquidity clienteles. More liquid ETFs charge higher fees in equilibrium and attract shorter horizon investors that are more sensitive to liquidity than to fees....

Speeding up the exchange does not necessarily improve liquidity. On the one hand, more speed enables a high-frequency market maker (HFM) to update his quotes faster on incoming news. This reduces his payoff risk and thus lowers the competitive bid-ask spread. On the other hand, HFM price quotes...

I build a model of delegated asset management with moral hazard and security lending. Lending markets transfer informational rents from short-sellers to funds. Investors optimally receive the proceeds as state-contingent dividends which correlate with shorting demand, providing a natural hedge....