The provision of global public goods, such as climate change mitigation and managing fisheries to avoid overharvesting, requires the coordination of national contributions. The contributions are managed by elected governments who, in turn, are subject to public pressure on the matter. In an...

We study the effect of leadership in an experimental threshold public "bad" game, where we manipulate both the relative returns of two investments (the more productive of which causes a negative externality) and the extent to which the gains from leadership diffuse to the group. The game...

In this paper, we study cooperation and coordination in a threshold public goods game with asymmetric players where players have different endowments 𝑒𝑖, productivities 𝑝𝑖, and rewards 𝑟𝑖. In general, this game has a defective Nash equilibrium (NE), in which no one contributes,...

We investigate the impact of various audit schemes on the future provision of public goods, when contributing less than the average of the group is sanctioned exogenously and the probability of an audit is unknown. We study how individuals update their beliefs about the probability of being...