Showing 1 - 10 of 14,149
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching … opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two … allowed to form blocking pairs. Second, dynamic matching markets exhibit a form of externality that is not present in static …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273775
We study a dynamic matching environment where individuals arrive sequentially. There is a tradeoff between waiting for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189037
Evidence suggests that participants in direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanisms (DA) play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria in DA. We find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698801
paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014478421
Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two goods in an incomplete information setting with a single principal, multiple agents with unit demand, and interdependent valuations. I construct a novel dynamic mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049
concerns. Instead of exogenously restricting transfers on a matching market, we introduce a desideratum based on fairness …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010519953
Many markets ban monetary transfers. Rather than exogenously imposing this constraint, we introduce discrimination-freeness as a desideratum based on egalitarian objectives. Discrimination-freeness requires that an agent's object assignment is independent of his wealth. We show that money cannot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012438206
Two-sided matching platforms can control and optimize over many aspects of the search for partners. To understand how … matching platforms should be designed, we introduce a dynamic two-sided search model with strategic agents who must bear a cost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011870575
Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof me- chanisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, participants dislike rejections and enjoy the confirmation from getting what they declared most desirable. Formally, the payoff from a match decreases in its position...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648382
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individually rational assignments. We show that it implies incentive, fairness, and implementation impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first are Pareto efficient, and undominated - in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011793994