Showing 121 - 130 of 209
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009843685
We develop a method to screen for local cartels. We first test whether there is statistical evidence of clustering of outlets that score high on some characteristic that is consistent with collusive behavior. If so, we determine in a second step the most suspicious regions where further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014040653
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014324924
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014486272
We study the effects of time-using rent-seeking activities on the macroeconomic allocation and the economic growth rate. We formulate a highly stylized three-sector general equilibrium model with overlapping generations of individuals. The production side features one sector producing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014431164
We examine the interaction between equity returns and firms’ financing policies in a stochastic Ramsey model with heterogeneous firms. Motivated by empirical evidence, firms maintain stationary financial leverage ratios by issuing debt. We present a novel closed-form solution to this class of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014257461
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009228947
We develop a model to analyse the interactions between actors involved in car and fuel taxation: consumers, car producers, fuel producers and the government. Heterogeneous consumers choose between two versions of a car that differ in engine type (diesel or gasoline). Car manufacturers and fuel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988126
Where markets are insufficiently competitive, governments can intervene by auctioning licenses to operate or by forcing divestitures. The Dutch government has done exactly that, organizing auctions to redistribute tenancy rights for high- way gasoline stations and forcing the divestiture of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137121
We present a theory that explains the prevalence of consumer boycotts. In our model, a firm does not know how concerned consumers are about the firm's misconduct. Because it is only optimal for the firm to alter its behavior if consumers are very concerned, consumers have an incentive to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572442