We run an experiment that implements a finitely repeated version of the trust game in which players can choose in each period with whom to interact. Change in trust and trustworthiness in terms of previous experience is statistically investigated where confounding factors are controlled for....

We use an experiment to study the effect of ex-post sharing rules on relationship-specific investments in an incomplete contracting context. We find that no power structure can induce first-best investments and that equally productive partners reach more efficient outcomes with a balanced power...

Although many real bargaining situations involve more than one person on each side of the bargaining table, much of the theoretical and experimental research concentrates on two single players. We study a simple extension: bilateral bargaining of four people (two two-person groups) with...

Bubbles are omnipresent in lab experiments with asset markets. But these experiments were (mostly) conducted in environments with only human traders. Today markets are substantially determined by algorithmic traders. Here we use a laboratory experiment to measure human trading behaviour changes...

We generate observable expectations about fiscal variables through laboratory experiments using real world data from several European countries as stimuli. We estimate an econometric model of individual expectations for fiscal policy, which nests various theories of expectations--forming and...

In this document we sketch some techniques that are useful when developing www moderated experiments. We describe a modular and, hence, very flexible approach. On all levels (clients, server, programming language, database, etc.) we compare alternatives that can be integrated. We argue that a...

We experimentally study the effects of locality in a repeated prisoners' dilemma. We compare players located on a circle with those in neighbourless groups. On circles players interact only with neighbours, but not with distant players. In groups all players interact with each other in the same...

In this paper we study equilibrium and experimental bidding behaviour in first-price and second-price auctions with outside options. We find that bidders do respond to outside options and to variations of common knowledge about competitors' outside options. However, overbidding in first-price...

We present a simple model of spatial evolution that avoids several problems that arise with more complex networks of players. We consider a world where pairs of players are matched forever. These players learn from the whole population but they are more likely to learn to strategies used by...