In a recent paper Mujumder (2004, Economics Letters) argued that only if the industry is a monopoly, we could be certain that the government could use profit tax to make up any shortfall in tariff revenue and also make the consumers and producers better off. We show that this result is not...

We show the effects of entry of a domestic firm and a foreign firm on welfare, in presence of licensing. In case of licensing with up-front fixed-fee, domestic entry increases welfare if the technological differences between the firms are not very large, whereas foreign entry increases welfare...

This paper shows that if number of firms is determined endogenously, Cournot competition generates higher welfare compared to Bertrand competition when products are sufficiently differentiated. If products are close substitutes, welfare is higher under Bertrand competition. We show that the...

This paper shows that technology licensing may be socially undesirable. Possibility of licensing increases the incentive for entry and thus, increases competition. If technology of the incumbent and entrant is sufficiently close, licensing-induced entry reduces social welfare. Otherwise,...

In a vertically separated industry, where the input suppliers have significantmarket power, not only entry but also the markets (upstream or downstream) withentry possibilities might be a concern to the policy makers. While ‘entry in thedownstream market only’ always increases welfare,...

This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a horizontallydifferentiated duopoly market with non-tournament R&D competition. We consider thatsuccess in R&D is uncertain. We show that whether firms invest more under Cournotcompetition or Bertrand competition is ambiguous and depends on...

This paper shows that the possibility of licensing can significantly alter theeffects of entry on social welfare. We find that while licensing with output royaltyalways raises welfare due to entry, licensing with up-front fixed-fee reduces thepossibility of lower welfare compared to a situation...

This paper shows the possibility of higher welfare under Cournot competitionin an asymmetric cost duopoly when the firms have the option for technology licensing.We find that if there is licensing with up-front fixed-fee, welfare is higher under Cournotcompetition compared to Bertrand...

Once a new technology has been invented, there is a credible threat of imitationwhen patents are long and imitation cost is low. When imitation is credible, the innovator hasan incentive to postpone technology adoption for relatively high cost of imitation. Thepossibility of licensing eliminates...

The literature on technology licensing has ignored the importance ofmarket power of the input supplier. In this paper we examine the incentive forlicensing in the downstream industry when the firms in the upstream industry havemarket power. We show that licensing in the downstream industry is...