We study a mechanism design problem under the assumption that renegotiation cannot be prevented. We investigate what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are renegotiation-proof under a variety of renegotiation procedures, and which social choice functions can be implemented in a way that is...

We study the relationship between the precision of information about the performance of an agent in a market, and the incentives this agent has for exerting effort to produce high quality. We show that this relationship can be nonmonotonic. There exists an efficient plausible equilibrium that...

This paper studies how different demographic groups respond to incentives by comparing performance in the GRE examination in "high" and "low" stakes situations. The high stakes situation is the real GRE examination and the low stakes situation is a voluntary experimental section of the GRE that...

We study what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are ex post renegotiation-proof (EPRP), i.e., robust against the possibility of ex post renegotiation under a variety of renegotiation procedures, and which social choice functions are EPRP implementable. In complete information environments...

We analyze a model of repeated franchise bidding for natural monopoly with contestable licensing - a franchisee halds an (exclusive) license to operate a franchise until another rm offers to pay more for it. In a world where quality is observable but not veri able, the simple regulatory scheme...

We present an economic argument for restraining certain voluntary agreements. We identify a class of situations where single individuals or parties may use the freedom to contract to subtly manipulate large groups of individuals by offering them contracts that promote free-riding behavior. We...

This paper examines the effects that the private selection of arbitrators have over arbitrators' incentives in deciding the cases before them over the arbitrators' implied bias. These effects have important implications for the design of Arbitration rules by Arbitration and Dispute Resolution...

We model the transition from a chaotic status quo to a more orderly political regime as a two-stage game involving two warring factions and the citizens. The warring factions move first and decide the form of government by (1) inviting an external arbitrator, (2) choosing the people as...

We propose a theory by which geographic variations in the transparency of the production process explain cross-regional differences in the scale of the state, in its hierarchical structure, and in property rights over land. The key linkage between geography and these institutions, we posit, is...