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Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design

Neeman, Zvika; Pavlov, Gregory - In: Journal of economic theory 148 (2013) 2, pp. 473-501

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010091379

Markets versus negotiations : the predominance of centralized markets

Neeman, Zvika; Vulkan, Nir - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 10 (2010) 1, pp. 1-28

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010007670

Corruption and openness

Neeman, Zvika; Paserman, M. Daniele; Simhon, Avi - In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy 8 (2008) 1, pp. 1-38

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010007785

Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital*

Moav and, Omer; Neeman, Zvika - In: The economic journal : the journal of the Royal … 122 (2012) 563, pp. 933-957

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010015461

THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES FOR EFFORT

MOAV, OMER; NEEMAN, ZVIKA - In: The journal of industrial economics 58 (2010) 3, pp. 642-661

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008451521

Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Neeman, Zvika - In: The review of financial studies 23 (2010) 3, pp. 1089-1089

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008407268

Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining under Asymmetric Information

Neeman, Zvika - In: The review of economic studies 66 (1999) 228, pp. 679-692

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007685703

Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids

Neeman, Zvika; Orosel, Gerhard O. - In: Journal of economic theory 85 (1999) 1, pp. 91-121

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007688314

Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach

Klement, Alon; Neeman, Zvika - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 21 (2005) 2, pp. 285-314

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006958121

Optimal Design Settlement Devices for Cases of Disputed Liability : Fee-Shifting Rules and Pleadings Mechanisms

Klement, Alon; Neeman, Zvika - 2013

We study the effect of alternative fee shifting rules on the probability of settlement when the defendant's liability is under dispute. Using a mechanism design approach we demonstrate that the probability of settlement is maximized by a particular Pleadings mechanism: Both parties are given the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014119241