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Debt ownership by equity-holding managers aligns their incentives more closely with those of creditors, thereby reducing agency costs of debt. We test this hypothesis by examining how terms of bank loans are related to executive pension and deferred compensation, i.e., inside debt held by...
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trustworthiness is not associated with a firm's actual credit rating, bankruptcy score, debt covenant violations, financial report …
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This paper is the first to study the effect of financial restatement on bank loan contracting. Compared with loans initiated before restatement, loans initiated after restatement have significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012773124
Lending corruption is an important agency problem for banks. Using data from the World Bank Business Environmental Survey, we find that in countries with more lending corruption, banks give more favorable loan terms to borrowers. This relation is stronger when firms are under more financing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012907312
We examine the contractual implications of lender trust in bank loan contracts. We measure a lender's trust using the average trust attitudes in the ancestral country of origin of its CEO. We find that banks with trusting CEOs charge lower loan rates. Furthermore, trusting lenders sanction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899252
This paper provides direct evidence that managerial style is a key determinant of the firm's cost of capital, in the context of private debt contracting. Applying the novel empirical method by Abowd, Karmarz, and Margolis (1999) to a large sample that tracks job movement of top managers, we find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012869959
Agency theory predicts that the incentives for insiders to extract private benefits at the expense of creditors are negatively related to the level of ownership retained by insiders. However, the ability of insiders to effectively control the resources of the firm and engage in such activities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012973139
Private firm financing, given the far-reaching importance of non-publicly traded companies for global output and employment, is still a relatively underexplored area. Since the seminal work of Petersen and Rajan (1994), only a small branch of research into private firms' cost of debt has been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012990197