theoretically to be effective in mitigating fraudulent expert behavior. We analyze whether this positive result carries over to when …

theoretically to be effective in mitigating fraudulent expert behavior. We analyze whether this positive result carries over to a … possible. However, inefficient equilibria can also exist. If, in equilibrium, experts provide diagnosis-independent treatments …

theoretically to be effective in mitigating fraudulent expert behavior. We analyze whether this positive result carries over to when …

customers. As experts provide both diagnosis and treatment, this leaves scope for fraud. We experimentally investigate how … to defraud his customers when the expert can build up reputation. We show that the level of fraud is significantly higher … intensity of price competition and the level of customer information about past expert behavior influence an expert’s incentive …

customers. As experts provide both diagnosis and treatment, this leaves scope for fraud. We experimentally investigate how … to defraud his customers when the expert can build up reputation. We show that the level of fraud is significantly higher … intensity of price competition and the level of customer information about past expert behavior influence an expert’s incentive …

customers. As experts provide both diagnosis and treatment, this leaves scope for fraud. We experimentally investigate how … to defraud his customers when the expert can build up reputation. We show that the level of fraud is significantly higher … intensity of price competition and the level of customer information about past expert behavior influence an expert’s incentive …

customers. As experts provide both diagnosis and treatment, this leaves scope for fraud. We experimentally investigate how … to defraud his customers when the expert can build up reputation. We show that the level of fraud is significantly higher … intensity of price competition and the level of customer information about past expert behavior influence an expert’s incentive …

-42, 2006). We consider various markets for credence goods and briefly discuss evidence on the extent of fraud. We then review … the market structure and institutional environment (separation of diagnosis and treatment, liability, verifiability …

-42, 2006). We consider various markets for credence goods and briefly discuss evidence on the extent of fraud. We then review … the market structure and institutional environment (separation of diagnosis and treatment, liability, verifiability …