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SYMMETRIC SCORING RULES AND A NEW CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BORDA COUNT

Heckelman, Jac C.; Ragan, Robi - In: Economic Inquiry 59 (2020) 1, pp. 287-299

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012281595

An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule

Dougherty, Keith L.; Pitts, Brian; Moeller, Justin; … - In: Public choice 158 (2013) 3/4, pp. 359-382

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010374590

The value of formalism : re-examining external costs and decision costs with multiple groups

Dougherty, Keith L.; Edward, Julian; Ragan, Robi - In: Public choice 163 (2015) 1/2, pp. 31-52

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011472018

Socialist indoctrination in school textbooks : the case of "Colección Bicentenario" in Venezuela

Saravia, Antonio; Mengolini, Clara; Ragan, Robi - In: The journal of private enterprise 36 (2021) 1, pp. 79-104

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012625720

An expected utility analysis of k-majority rules

Dougherty, Keith L.; Ragan, Robi - In: Constitutional political economy 27 (2016) 3, pp. 332-353

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011776362

An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule

Dougherty, Keith; Pitts, Brian; Moeller, Justin; Ragan, Robi - In: Public Choice 158 (2014) 3, pp. 359-382

Scholars traditionally claim that unanimity rule is more capable of producing Pareto optimal outcomes than majority rule. Dougherty and Edward (Public Choice 151(3):655–678, <CitationRef CitationID="CR16">2012</CitationRef>) make the opposite claim assuming proposals are either random, sincere, or strategic. We test these competing...</citationref>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988170

Borda count in a forward agenda

Dougherty, Keith L.; Ragan, Robi - In: Public choice 199 (2024) 1/2, pp. 27-44

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014550433

Institutional sources of policy bias: A computational investigation

Ragan, Robi - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 25 (2013) 4, pp. 467-491

Representative democracy translates the preferences of the electorate into policy outcomes. Individual voters do not directly vote on policy; rather, their elected representatives create and establish policy. How well do the institutions of representative democracy translate the preferences of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011135421