This article surveys the theoretical literature on legislative bargaining with endogenous status-quo. These are the legislative bargaining situations in which in each period a new policy is decided and the policy implemented in the event of no agreement is endogenously determined by the outcome...

This article surveys the theoretical literature on legislative bargaining with endogenous status-quo. These are the legislative bargaining situations in which in each period a new policy is decided and the policy implemented in the event of no agreement is endogenously determined by the outcome...

The paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a model of dynamic spatial legislative bargaining. Players bargain over policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a majority vote takes place between the proposal of a randomly selected player and the status-quo,...

Prior research on 'strategic voting' has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad: it results in destruction of information, and hence makes voters worse off. We show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous, i.e.,...

When Herrero (1985) extends Rubinstein's (1982) alternating-offers bargaining model to the case of three or more players any agreement can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome, given a sufficiently large discount factor. We show that this is not the case when players...

Solution uniqueness is an important property for a bargaining model. Rubinstein's (1982) seminal 2-person alternating-offer bargaining game has a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium outcome. Is it possible to obtain uniqueness results in the much enlarged setting of multilateral bargaining with a...

Prior research on “strategic voting” has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad: it results in destruction of information, and hence makes voters worse off. We show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous, i.e.,...

This article presents the basics of argumentation theory. The relations of the argument with the concept of logical inference and an illustration of argument in international comparative policy analysis: the analysis of arguments in the invasion of Iraq