Narrow search
Showing 41 - 50 of 76,041
Cover Image
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
Auster, Sarah; Pavoni, Nicola - 2021
We study the delegation problem between a principal and an agent, who not only has better information about the … show that limited awareness of actions improves communication in such signalling games: the principal makes a coarser …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012418278
Cover Image
Rewarding mediocrity? : optimal regulation of R&D markets with reputation concerns
Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017
In this paper, we consider a dynamic signaling model of an R&D market in which a researcher can choose either a safe …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623886
Cover Image
On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure
Terstiege, Stefan - In: Economics letters 163 (2018), pp. 83-86
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011982956
Cover Image
The timing of discretionary bonuses : effort, signals, and reciprocity
Boosey, Luke; Goerg, Sebastian J. - In: Games and economic behavior 124 (2020), pp. 254-280
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432168
Cover Image
Essays on communication in game theory
Honryo, Takakazu - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011818560
Cover Image
The timing of discretionary bonuses : effort, signals, and reciprocity
Boosey, Luke; Goerg, Sebastian J. - 2018
In a real-effort experiment, we investigate how the timing of discretionary bonuses affects the relationship between workers and managers. Average output is substantially higher if bonuses are paid in the middle rather than upfront or at the end, as workers increase first-period output to signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011871948
Cover Image
Mechanism design by an informed principal : a common value model and applications
Tisljar, Rolf - 2003 - 1. Aufl.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004800817
Cover Image
The Timing of Discretionary Bonuses : Effort, Signals, and Reciprocity
Boosey, Luke - 2018
In a real-effort experiment, we investigate how the timing of discretionary bonuses affects the relationship between workers and managers. Average output is substantially higher if bonuses are paid in the middle rather than upfront or at the end, as workers increase first-period output to signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012915741
Cover Image
Delegation and Information Revelation
Gautier, Axel; Paolini, Dimitri - 2003
This paper addresses the question of delegation in an organisation where there is an initial asymmetry of information … be contracted for. With these simple contracts, we show that delegation is an alternative to contracting to elicit agent … sequence of decisions, the information learned by the principal can be used for the other decisions. So delegation is only …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151717
Cover Image
On Cheating and Whistle-Blowing
Berentsen, Aleksander; Brügger, Esther; Lörtscher, Simon - 2004
We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents' behavior. This inspection game has a unique (Bayesian) equilibrium in mixed strategies. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077977