We consider payment schemes in experiments that model infinite-horizon games by using random termination. We compare paying subjects cumulatively for all periods of the game; with paying subjects for the last period only; with paying for one of the periods, chosen randomly. Theoretically,...

Antitrust exemptions granted to businesses under extenuating circumstances are often justified by the argument that they benefit the public by helping producers adjust to otherwise difficult economic circumstances. Such exemptions may allow firms to coordinate their capacities, as was the case...

Antitrust exemptions granted to businesses under extenuating circumstances are often justified by the argument that they benefit the public by helping producers adjust to otherwise difficult economic circumstances. Such exemptions may allow firms to coordinate their capacities, as was the case...

We explain laboratory behavior in the dictator, ultimatum and trust games based on two cultural dimensions adopted from social and cultural anthropology: grid and group, which translate into reciprocity and altruism, respectively, in such games. Altruism and reciprocity characteristics are...

We survey experimental research on multi-unit auctions with an emphasis on topics that may be of a unifying interest to experimental, as well as theoretical and empiri- cal economists. Topics include static and dynamic multi-unit auctions; combinatorial auctions and efficient auction design;...

We study how people's predisposition towards altruism affects their behavior in a voluntary contributions public good experiment. We investigate whether a high level of contributions can be sustained in groups of subjects who have been pre-selected on the basis of their altruistic inclinations....

This article reports the results of an experimental study of the three firm location problem. We compare the subjects' behavior in the experiments with the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium calculated by Shaked. Overall, the findings are consistent with the equilibrium prediction....