In a two-part review, we focus on the behavioral experimental literature on corruption from the past decade with a particular focus on papers that offer behavioral insights into corrupt decision-making. In this first chapter, we restrict attention to the prominent theoretical models that have...

We use a simple trust-game to elicit trusting and trustworthy behavior among students majoring in economics and other disciplines. We also administer a Social Values Orientation (SVO) survey to evaluate any possible correlation between an individual's levels of trust indicated in the survey and...

The traditional description of Contestability theory considers the importance of potential entry threats in disciplining the incumbent firm in a natural monopoly market. Such a description however overlooks an important element in strategic interaction, that of an entrant firm having its own...

Over the last decade, randomized evaluations have taken the field of development economics by storm. Despite the availability of strong review pieces in the topic, there is no pedagogical paper on randomized evaluation. This paper bridges the gap by introducing three interactive classroom games...

A large literature is concerned with analysis and empirical application of theories of decision making for environments with risky outcomes. Expected value theory has been known for centuries to be subject to critique by St. Petersburg paradox arguments. More recently, theories of risk aversion...

This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to...

This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to...

Does the procedure of entitlement affect fairness perceptions? We use a dictator game to study the question in mixed gender pairs. In our experiments, we vary the process of entitlement across treatments. Allocators in our dictator game can inherit an amount without any effort, earn an amount...

In an artefactual field experiment, we introduce a novel allocation game to investigate the role of procedural altruism in household decision-making and study choices of married spouses. Subjects can distribute their earnings from the experiment either on food items (joint consumption good), or...

This paper combines unique experimental and survey data to examine the determinants of self-selection into a training program. Women residing in selected disadvantaged areas in New Delhi, India were invited to apply for a six-month long subsidized training program in stitching and tailoring. A...