This paper introduces a new geometric method for constructing equilibrium distributions in the Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric battlefield values, generalizing the construction method of Laslier and Picard (2002). Our method does particularly well in instances of the Colonel Blotto game in...

We analyze the social and private learning at the symmetric equilibria of a queueing game with strategic experimentation. An infinite sequence of agents arrive at a server which processes them at an unknown rate. The number of agents served at each date is either: a geometric random variable in...

We analyze a model in which individuals have hereditary reproductive types. The reproductive value of an individual is determined by her reproductive type and the amount of resources she can access. We introduce the possibility of suicide and assume it is also a genetic trait that interacts with...

This paper considers a two-player game of strategic experimentation with competition. Each agent faces a two-armed bandit problem where she continually chooses between her private risky arm and a common, safe arm. Each agent has exclusive access to her private arm. However, the common arm can...

This paper analyses a stopping game in which two players choose between learning about the quality of their private risky arm, and competing for the use of a single shared safe option. A player whose risky arm produces a success stops competing for the safe option. We assume that each player...