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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009627449
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010480238
We develop a theoretical framework in which political and economic cycles are jointly determined. These cycles are driven by three political economy frictions: policymakers are non-benevolent, they cannot commit to policies, and they have private information about the tightness of the government...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100994
We develop a theoretical framework in which political and economic cycles are jointly determined. These cycles are driven by three political economy frictions: policymakers are non-benevolent, they cannot commit to policies, and they have private information about the tightness of the government...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013107406
We develop a theoretical framework in which political and economic cycles are jointly determined. These cycles are driven by three political economy frictions: policymakers are non-benevolent, they cannot commit to policies, and they have private information about the tightness of the government...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930795
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010753948
We develop a theoretical framework in which political and economic cycles are jointly determined. These cycles are driven by three political economy frictions: policymakers are non-benevolent, they cannot commit to policies, and they have private information about the tightness of the government...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011123616
We study the provision of dynamic incentives to self-interested politicians in an environment in which politicians cannot commit to policies and have private information about the size of government resources. In this environment, citizens discipline politicians by threatening to remove them...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011081442
We study the quantitative properties of constrained efficient allocations in an environment where risk sharing is limited by the presence of private information. We consider a life cycle version of a standard Mirrlees economy where shocks to labor productivity have a component that is public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009440991
This paper studies the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) adverse selection environment, relaxing the assumption of exclusivity of insurance contracts. Agents can engage in multiple insurance contracts simultaneously, and the terms of these contracts are not observed by other firms. Insurance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009440997