We develop a rationale for the payment by firms of a wage premium on marginal, or overtime, weekly hours. We examine wage-hours contracts within the framework of a two-period specific human capital model with asymmetric information. The wage premium serves to achieve contract efficiency. For...

I present a model in which individuals compete for a prize by choosing to apply or not. Abilities are private information and in attempt to select the best candidate, the committee compares applicants with an imperfect technology. The choice of application cost, size of the prize and use of...

Globally, real estate trade is highly regularized. Usually, the market value is not negotiated simply between the seller and potential buyer but based on an assessment performed by a professional valuer, known as a surveyor or appraiser. This paper inquires about the economic role of valuers in...

This paper addresses the puzzle how employers that invest in general human capital can gain an information advantage with respect to the ability of their employees when training is certified by credible external institutions. We apply an established model from the employer-learning literature...

We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverseselection and study a generalized Rothschildand Stiglitz model where agents may differ with respect to theaccidental probability and their expenditure levels incase an accident occurs. We investigate the nature of dynamicinsurance...