We analyze the interaction between the incentives for free-riding and information revelation among partners in a dynamic setting. Partners contribute to the value of a common project, but have private information about the success of their own contribution efforts. The desire to maintain a...

This paper provides evidence on the behavior of public debt managers during fiscal" stabilizations in OECD countries over the last two decades. We find that debt maturity tends to" lengthen the more credible the program, the lower the long-term interest rate and the higher the" volatility of...

Much of corporate managers’ incentive is related to the stock price. Consequently, a firm can design its corporate information environment to tackle its manager’s moral hazard problem. We analyze a model in which the manager needs to exert costly effort to implement a risky, long-term...

Worried about unwittingly buying counterfeits, online customers often resort to “the wisdom of crowds” (e.g., product reviews) before purchasing. However, unethical sellers may game the review system through buying fake reviews. In this paper, we use a two-period game theoretical model to...

We empirically examine on-exchange hidden liquidity in the context of informed trading, pricing efficiency, and trading costs. Using a number of proxies for informativeness and a number of different specifications, we find that when an on-exchange option to hide orders exists, traders prefer to...

We design an experiment to study how reversible entry decisions are affected by public and private payoff disclosure policies. In our environment, subjects choose between a risky payoff, which evolves according to an autoregressive process, and a constant outside option payoff. The treatments...

When there is strategic complementarity and all agents have access to public information, but only a subset of them has access to private information, strategic complementarity within the subset of privately-informed agents enhances the focal power of public information. This results to an...

I examine a cheap talk game with two decisions, two payoff-relevant states, and two senders. The model features interdependence because information about each state affects both decisions. Senders are imperfectly informed and communication depends on the nature of their information. I first...

A durable good monopolist faces a continuum of heterogeneous customers who make purchase decisions by comparing present and expected price-quality offers. The monopolist designs a sequence of price-quality menus to segment the market. We consider the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of a game...

We investigate how loan terms respond to competition between lenders when borrowers have multidimensional private information. In our model, competitive lenders screen borrowers using contracts that consist of an interest rate and a collateral requirement. Compared to a monopolistic lender, a...