strategic decisions. While largely descriptive of tender offers for control, the auction framework also helps explain choices … made in takeover negotiations where the outside option is the outcome of an open auction. Empirical findings include the … public bid deters further competition. When rival bidder do enter the auction, they do so surprisingly quickly - within two …

of the higher type. We then study an auction platform that matches each seller to two agents, and show that the optimal …

overbidding in auctions. As a workhorse we use the second-price all-pay and the first-price winner-pay auction. Both risk and …. Indeed, we find that spite is a more convincing explanation for bidding behavior for the second-price all-pay auction. Not …

’ bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price … auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities …

a simple design initially enhances competition in the auction. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi …-dimensional auction, as the optimal scoring rule depends only on the price. …