This paper uses real options analysis to study later round financing in the presence of two standard venture capital contracting provisions: anti-dilution (ratchet) and liquidation preference. We argue that such provisions can preclude financing of a positive NPV venture in the case of a large...

This article questions the allocation of control rights to venture capitalists with particular focus on liquidation decisions. The literature has shown that the venture capitalist acts as the principal to prevent the agent (i.e., the entrepreneur) from pursuing private objectives and destroying...

Agency explanations of the venture capital process routinely assume that entrepreneurs and venture capitalists have time-consistent (“TC”) preferences, and thus perfect self-control. Given the growing evidence on self-control problems, from both experiments and field studies, it is natural...

I show that VCs frequently have the right to veto specific operational and financial decisions even though they are equity investors with access to other powerful governance mechanisms. Across 182 first-round U.S. venture capital investments, restrictive covenants are commonplace with 92 percent...

The two essays that comprise this dissertationseek to explain the benefits of financial contracting in banking and venturecapital. The second essay, “Vesting and Control in Venture Capital Contracts,”examines the common practice of timing equity payments to entrepreneurs inventure capital...